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Abstract 
According to the broadcast encryption scheme with wide applications in the real world without considering its 
security and efficiency in the model simultaneously, a fully secure broadcast encryption for inner-product predicates 
(IPBE) was proposed by combining with Waters dual system encryption methodology and inner-product predicate 
encryption. Based on the standard model, the scheme can not only achieve constant-size key and ciphertext, but also 
guarantee the security of the plaintext M as well as the security of the attribute vectors. Furthermore, the scheme is 
proved by using a non-interactive static assumption and the analysis results indicated that the scheme is fully secure.  
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of Harbin University 
of Science and Technology. 
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1. Introduction
The concept of the broadcast encryption were introduced by Fiat and Naor[1] firstly, which allow a 
sender, who wants to send a message to a dynamically chosen subset S of users, to construct a ciphertext 
such that only users in S can decrypt. It has become a new hot spot of the Cryptology promptly. Many 
broadcast encryption schemes [2-4] with special purpose were proposed consecutively. However, these 
schemes had some deficiency obviously, for example, their security was based on the strong assumption 
or non-standard cryptographic assumption; the scheme only guaranteed chosen plaintext security or 
selective-ID security; the scheme was designed under the random oracle model, etc.
Predicate encryption is an important cryptographic primitive that has been recently studied [5~8] and 
that has found wide applications as it allows for fine-grained key management. Roughly speaking, in a 
predicate encryption scheme, secret keys correspond to predicates in some class F , and ciphertexts 
correspond to attributes in Σ . Until now, there have been three inner-product predicates encryption
（IPE） schemes suggested [6-8].  The scheme [6] shows how inner-product predicates can be used as a 
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building block to construct a wide class of predicates and can be realized in composite-order groups. The 
scheme [8] introduces a new method of using n-dimensional vector spaces in prime order groups, and 
shows how the delegation functionality is realized in an IPE scheme. Recently, Lewko et al [7] gave fully 
secure implementation for the inner-product predicate. However, these constructions only guaranteed the 
semantic security and security guarantee for specific predicates just in the selective model.  
Our Contribution: In this work, the definition of IPBE and the security model for them were firstly 
proposed, then by combining with Waters dual system encryption methodology and inner-product 
predicate encryption, a fully secure broadcast encryption for inner-product predicates was brought 
forward. Based on the standard model, the scheme can achieve constant-size ciphertext which constrain 
only two group exponents, and guarantee the security of the plaintext M as well as the security of the 
attribute vectors.  
2. Preliminaries 
2.1. Definition of Broadcast Encryption for Inner- Product Predicate (IPBE) 
A IPBE scheme consists of four probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms as following semantics: 
Setup: takes as input the security parameter λ1 and the attribute length n , outputs the master public 
key Pk  and the master secret key Mk .
KeyGen: takes as input the master secret key Mk and the predicate 1( , , )nk k=k K , outputs the 
decryption key Skk  associated with k .
Encrypt: takes as input the public key Pk , attribute string assemblage { {0 1} }n∈x x ，  and 
message M from the associated message space and returns ciphertextC .
Decrypt: takes as input a secret key Skk and a ciphertext C , outputs the message M or the 
distinguished symbol⊥ .
2.2. Security Definition for Fully Secure Inner-Product Predicate Broadcast Encryption 
We start by defining the security game realGame between an adversary A and a challengerℜ for IPBE. 
realGame consist of a Setup phase and a Query Answering phase. More precisely, we have the following 
description. 
Setup: ℜ inputs the security parameter λ and the length parameter n to generate public 
parameters pk and master secret key mk .
Key Query Answering: Upon receiving a query for predicate vector y , ℜ returns ( , )KeyGen mk y .
Challenge: Upon receiving the pair 0 1( , )x x , and challenge plaintexts ),( 10 mm , ℜ picks 
random }1,0{∈η and returns ( , )Encrypt pk ηx . A outputs a guess 'η forη at the end of the game. We define 
that A wins the game if 'ηη = and if for all y for which A has issued a Key Query, it holds ( ) 1f =k x .
2.3. Complexity Assumptions 
Assumption (n-extended decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption (n-eDDH)): The n-eDDH problem 
is given )1(),}{,},,{,,,( 11
λγγγω eDDHn
bbnji
h
ni
hhk
G Yggggggparam
jiiiii −
≤≠≤≤≤
+ ℵ⎯⎯← , to guess }1,0{∈b ,
where )1(),,,,(:)1( λλ ℵ←=ℵ − egGGqparam TGeDDHnb . Uniformly select qii Fh ∈γω ,,i for ni ,,1K= ,
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*k qF∈  and GY ∈2 ，sets ωkgY =0 ，then return ),}{,},,{,,,( 11 bnjihnihhkG Yggggggparam jiiiii ≤≠≤≤≤+ γγγω . For 
a probabilistic machine A , the advantage of A for the n-eDDH problem is defined as: [ ] [ ])1(1),1(Pr)1(1),1(Pr:)( 10 λλλλ ρρρρλ eDDHneDDHneDDHnA AAAdv −−− ℵ←→−ℵ←→= .
Definition1: For any polynomial time adversary A , the advantage )(λeDDHnAAdv − is negligible.  
3. Our IPBE Scheme 
3.1. Construction 
In this section, we describe our construction for a broadcast encryption for inner-product predicates.  
Setup ),1( nλ : The algorithm chooses a description of a bilinear group ( , , *) (1 ,2 3)nRparam n
λ←ℵ +BB ,
and 1 2 1 2 3ˆ ( , , , , )n n nβ β β β+ +=B K , the public parameters are ˆ(1 , , )nRpk paramλ= B and the master secret key 
is *mk = B , then return mk and pk .
KeyGen(
1 2
, : ( , , , )
nl l l l
mk k k k= Lk ): Every user in the system with identity l ( ml ,,1L= ), 
which m is the maximal number of user. The key generation algorithm chooses random qll F∈ησ , , and 
sets
* * *
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Encrypt:
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collection
1 2
{ ( , , , ), 1, , }
nl l l l l
x x x l h= =x x K K under the constraint that
1
( ) 0
h
l l
l=
⋅ =∑x k , the encryption algorithm 
chooses randomly qF∈ξδδ ,, 21 , and return the ciphertext ),( 21 CCC= , where 
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Decrypt ( 1 2, , ( , )lpk sk C Ck ): Upon receiving a ciphertext ),( 21 CCC = , the legitimate user l computes 
and return message 2
1( , )l
C
m
e C s k
=
k
.
3.2. Correctness 
Let ),( 21 CCC= is legitimate ciphertext, then the correctness can be easily described by the following 
qualities { ,0, 0,1, ,0} *
l l l l
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3.3. Efficiency 
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Comparing with the current broadcast encryption, the novel scheme based on the standard model, can 
achieve constant-size ciphertext constrained two group exponents. Furthermore, Encryption algorithm 
does not require the bilinear pair computation and Decryption algorithm only need one. The scheme has 
been proved by using a non-interactive static assumption to guarantee the security of the plaintext m as 
well as the security of the attribute vectors. In addition, the analysis results indicated that the new scheme 
is fully secure and is better than other IPE schemes in the selective model. 
4. Security Analysis 
From Lemma 22 in literature [9], we can obtain: for any adversary A , there is a probabilistic 
machine ℜ , whose running time is essentially the same as that of A , such that for any security 
parameterλ , )()( 2 λλ PAeDDHn AdvAdv =−ℜ .
Theorem For any adversary A and any security parameter λ , there exist probabilistic 
machines ),,1( tkCk K= , who running the same times as that of A , such that      
.)()(
0 q
tt
k
eDDHn
C
PBE
A k
AdvAdv +≤∑ = − λλ where t is the maximum number of adversary A 's key queries. Thus, 
the proposed IPBE scheme shows adaptively attribute-hiding against chosen plaintext attacks security 
under the n-eDDH assumption. 
Proof: To prove Theorem, we consider a sequence of 3+t games between A and a challengerℜ for a 
probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A which makes t queries for KeyGen .
0Game : The real security game described in the previous section. 
1Game : Same as 0Game except that ℜ uses ])([ 3221211
)(
1
1
1 +++==
=
+++= ∑∑∑ nninni ini ibl
h
l
bbbbxC
i
δξωδ
and )(2
bh
T mgC
ξ= instead of the target ciphertext for challenge plaintexts ),( )1()0( mm and challenge attributes 
(0) (1)( , )x x , where qF∈ξδδ ,, 21 , }1,0{∈b , ( ) ( ) ( )1( , , )b b bnx x =xK , and 1( , , ) \{ }nn qFω ω ∈ 0K are uniformly selected. 
kGame →2  ( tk ,,1K= ): 02→Game is 1Game . kGame →2 is the same as )1(2 −→ kGame except the 
reply to the k -th key query for 1( , , )nk k=k K is: * 22* 121
*
1
*)(:* ++= += +++= ∑∑ nnni inini ii rksk ηββββσ , where 
qF∈ησ , and 1( , , ) nn qr r F= ∈r K .
3Game : Same as tGame→2 except that the target ciphertext ),( 21 CC for challenge plaintexts ),(
)1()0( mm
and challenge attributes (0) (1)( , )x x is ]'[' 3221211
'
1
1 +++==
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+++= ∑∑∑ nninni ini il
h
l
i
xC βδβξβωβ , )(2 ' bhT mgC ξ= , where 
qn Fxx ∈',,,',,' 21 ξξδK , }1,0{∈b , and 1( , , ) \{ }nn qFω ω ∈ 0K are uniformly selected. In particular, 
)',,'( 1 nxx K and 'ξ are chosen uniformly and independently from (0) (1)( , )x x andξ .
Let )(0 λAAdv , )(1 λAAdv , )(2 λkAAdv → , )(3 λAAdv  denote the advantage )(λIPBEAAdv
of A in 0Game , 1Game , kGame →2 , 3Game respectively. It is clear that 0)(
3 =λAAdv because the 
value of b is independent from the adversary's view in 3Game .
From three lemmas(lemmas24-lemmas26) has been proved in paper [9], we can evaluate the gaps with 
pairs of )(0 λAAdv , )(1 λAAdv , )(2 λkAAdv− ( vk ,,1K= ), )(3 λAAdv and obtain 
320  SUN Jin and HU Yu-pu / Procedia Engineering 29 (2012) 316 – 320 Author name / Procedia Engineering 00 (2011) 000–0 0  
.)()()(
)()()()()()()()(
1
3
32
1
2)1(2100
21
0 q
tv
k
P
B
P
BA
A
t
A
v
k
k
A
k
AAAA
IPBE
A
k
AdvAdvAdv
AdvAdvAdvAdvAdvAdvAdvAdv
++≤+
−+−+−≤=
∑
∑
=
→
=
→−→
λλλ
λλλλλλλλ
Thus, there exist probabilistic machines ),,1( vkCk K= , whose running times are essentially the same as 
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5. Conclusions 
In view of no general constructions for specific predicates which guarantee the security of the attribute 
vectors, the new scheme was proposed to enjoy flexibility of expressive access policy and efficiency of 
small ciphertext and public key. Moreover, any group member can encrypt/decrypt the message 
simultaneously to satisfy the many-to-many secure group communication requirements. The scheme is 
proved by using a non-interactive static assumption, the analysis results indicated that the scheme is fully 
secure and can satisfy the higher efficiency and practice requirement. 
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